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Low Expectations, High Growth:
The Economy and Reform in 1987
Penelope B. Prime
The political roller coaster China rode in 1987 also proved unsettling
for the economic reforms. Assurances that the reforms would con
tinue and the appointment of Zhao Ziyang to replace Hu Yaobang as
the Party general secretary gave little solace initially. Following Hu's
resignation, expectations concerning the acceleration, or even the
maintenance, of China's reform program fell. Major reform initiatives
such as the proposed bankruptcy law were put on hold. Debate en
sued over the effect on socialism of separating management from
ownership, decreasing the role of the Party and ministries in enter
prise operations, altering relative prices through price reform, and al
lowing income inequalities to widen. Periodic attacks by Party conser
vatives on influential intellectuals who had openly expressed their
liberal ideas added to the atmosphere of uncertainty. By year's end,
however, hints of the compromises reached at the Party retreat held
in Beidaihe in August were confirmed by a strong pro-reform stance
taken at the Thirteenth Party Congress held in October. Reform had
won the day, although the victory had not been easy.
In the midst of uncertainties concerning the future of reform, the
economy began to exhibit serious macroeconomic imbalances. Eco
nomic growth was steady at the start of 1987, and then it began to
take off.1 By mid-year, accelerating growth was accompanied by infla
tion and over-investment in some sectors, causing the government to
re-impose price and investment controls. Ironically, although the con
tinuation of economic reforms was endorsed by the Thirteenth Party
Congress, the strains of macroeconomic imbalances may now stand in
the way of their implementation.
1 Unless otherwise noted, statistics on China's economic performance are from Beijing
Review; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), China Daily Report, and Xinhua.
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China's experiment with a wide variety of changes in economic pol
icy and the economic system, collectively referred to as economic re
form, has been going on since 1979. Compared with the economic
system in place before 1979, many of these reforms represent radical
shifts in the levels of decision making and the use of incentives.
Changes were often implemented first on a trial basis in one region,
city, or group of enterprises. If the trial reform proved to be success
ful, then the central economic offices encouraged general implementa
tion. Also, rather than trying too many changes at once, the Party has
introduced reforms gradually. Because of this approach, however,
compatibility and uniformity have been lacking during this transi
tional period, and this has allowed the process of implementation to
disrupt the overall balance of the economy.
Such disruption serves as ammunition for political conflict over
both the implementation process and the reforms themselves. Al
though most of the resulting problems in the economy are due to the
nature of the transition and not to the fact that particular reforms are
necessarily failing, and despite the fact that the problems are tempo
rary, they create pressure for retreat. This pressure comes both from
people unsympathetic to the reform effort and from those who favor
changes in the process to ease the economic dislocations and thereby
to prevent the reforms from being abandoned altogether. The overall
goal of the reforms is to replace administrative controls with a system
that utilizes indirect influences over the economy such as price and
tax incentives. When imbalances result, the most expedient solution is
to reimpose administrative controls. Such controls, however, are di
rectly opposite to the goal of reform, and once imposed, they are not
easily removed. For example, between 1980 and 1982 and again in
1985, administrative measures put in place in response to shortages,
inflation, and domestic and international deficits took precedence over
reform.

Economic Growth in 1987
Many of these same imbalances were again problematic in 1987. In
flation was higher than in 1986, shortages of food emerged, and
over-investment in some sectors continued to occur—all familiar prob
lems in past periods when the economy "overheated." In addition,
state revenues continued to decline as a proportion of national income
as a result of the reforms. At mid-year national government revenues
were 1.7 percent below planned levels.
However, two important results of the reforms countered the imbal
ances: a near-record grain harvest and a reduction in the trade deficit.
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The harvest reached 402 million tons, representing a 2.8 percent in
crease over 1986 and second only to the record harvest of 405 tons in
1984. By promoting exports and restricting imports, China ended 1987
with a trade deficit of $3.5 billion after two years of substantially
larger deficits. Both the good harvest and the improved trade balance
will give China some maneuverability in 1988 to deal with the ten
sions resulting from imbalanced growth. A good harvest ensures
plentiful food supplies to urban workers without necessitating grain
imports, and it provides fodder for other food production such as
meat and dairy products. The improved trade balance means central
officials can consider easing restrictions on capital imports to upgrade
technology and lessen the demand for domestic inputs.
Looking more closely at individual sectors, we see evidence of both
growth and imbalance. Growth by definition improves the supply
side of the economy. At the same time, if growth of complementary
goods is uneven, quality is poor, or demand grows faster than sup
ply, then imbalances both within and between sectors emerge despite
the apparently healthy growth rates. Rapid growth exacerbates these
problems when they exist.
In industry, growth rates were higher in 1987 than in 1986, but not
as high as in 1985, when China experienced its fastest growth rates
since the reforms began. In the first six months of 1985, for example,
industrial production had increased 24 percent. Many analysts and of
ficials in China viewed such a high rate with alarm. They feared such
high growth would cause serious imbalances and put the reform pro
gram in jeopardy. Government controls to slow growth were imposed
at the time, with the result that average industrial growth for the year
fell to 18 percent. Relatively slower growth followed in 1986, with an
annual average of 11.1 percent. Then in 1987 industrial growth began
to accelerate once again, reaching 16 percent by mid-year with no
signs of slowing in the third quarter. At this point Chinese officials
were concerned that a repeat of the much-too-rapid growth of 1985
was possible and that perhaps this problem of overheating was not
actually temporary in nature.2 In September control measures were in
stituted that curtailed credit and investment spending. These mea
sures seem to have been effective. By the end of 1987 the annual
growth rate was down to 14.5 percent.
Rural industry grew more rapidly than industry overall, with the
gross value of industrial output increasing 19 percent to reach 450 bil
lion yuan ($120.97 billion3). If rural industry is included in the indus
2 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1987, pp. 76-78.
1 using an exchange rate of 3.72 yuan per U.S. dollar.
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trial growth figures, then the gross value of industrial output in
creased 16.5 percent for the year, reaching 1,378 billion yuan ($370.43
billion). Steel production reached 56 million tons, an increase of 7.7
percent over 1986. Heavy industry increased at approximately the
same rate as light industry after a number of years of lagging growth.
However, growth in energy (much needed) was mixed. Annual in
creases in electricity were respectable at 12.3 percent, reaching 500 bil
lion kilowatt hours, but coal output increased only 1.93 percent to 900
million tons, and crude oil increased only 3.3 percent to 135 million
tons.
In agriculture, 1987 saw substantial improvements over 1986. Since
1986 was a relatively poor year, however, these increases are not as
impressive as they first appear. As with grain, both cotton and oil
crops had fallen in 1986 but regained in 1987; cotton increased 10 per
cent after falling 14.6 percent in 1986, and oil crops increased 12 per
cent after falling 6.4 percent in 1986. The number of cattle and sheep
increased in 1987, but the number of pigs was down, contributing to
shortages of pork in urban areas.
Commerce and services generally have received a tremendous boost
with the post-1978 reforms. In 1987 this trend continued with an in
crease of 17.5 percent in retail sales, or a 9.7 percent increase when
inflation is taken into account. Leading the way were increases in
sales of household items and food. Wholesale business also increased.
In 1987 purchases by state commerce departments and supply and
marketing cooperatives increased 18.6 percent over 1986. These aggre
gate figures, however, obscure the fact that supply has fallen seri
ously behind with respect to goods in high demand such as color tele
visions, refrigerators, certain textiles, and high-quality goods in
general. The shortage of pork, for example, was a shortage in the bet
ter cuts of pork, not of pork per se.
Combined increases in wages and credit led to major increases in
demand. On average, real wages increased 1.3 percent in urban areas
and 3.3 percent in rural areas. While increases in demand due to
these real-wage increases alone may have been manageable, addi
tional demand due to credit expansion was not. Credit to rural areas
was particularly generous. In the first eight months of 1987 loans out
standing from rural banks and credit cooperatives increased to 285.68
billion yuan ($76.80 billion), an 8.9 percent increase over the same pe
riod in 1986. Credit to rural industry increased almost 40 percent, and
loans for farm production were up over 78 percent. Low-interest loans
to poor rural areas also increased substantially. Not surprisingly,
tighter monetary controls have been proposed for 1988. These in
creases in credit allowed rapid increases in spending by enterprises,
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institutions, and other social organizations. In 1987, as in the last
three years, this component of demand increased faster than private
consumer spending. Despite high spending, bank saving deposits in
creased an annual average of 38.7 percent compared with 1986. These
deposits represent latent demand that if spent would have increased
demand pressures in 1987; they now will be a consideration in esti
mates for future supply needs.

Current Problems
Despite the fact that the worst fears of overheating did not come to
pass, imbalances clearly persisted. Several current problems that re
late to, and in some cases exacerbate, these imbalances are the
long-term prospects for improvements in grain production, inflation,
misguided investment, and poor performance by state industry.
The agricultural sector has continued to be hampered by a slowing
of productivity and of output increases in grain production. The good
harvest of 1987 was welcomed, but many are concerned about the
long-run trend. Increases in investment in the agricultural sector are
one solution, and there was some improvement here in 1987. Sales of
agricultural capital goods were up 22.4 percent over 1986. But grain
prices are low relative to many cash crops, and fertilizer prices have
been rising. Chinese analysts argue that these trends have discour
aged expansion of grain production. Other problems that have serious
long-term consequences are the worsening fertility and erosion of
land, decreases in land devoted to agriculture, inadequate infrastruc
ture, and a lack of organizations serving agriculture.
Grain prices may have been stable, but the average price level was
not. After an official inflation rate of 6 percent in 1986, inflation con
tinued to rise in 1987, albeit modestly, to an official rate of 7 percent.
Although not a high rate by other countries' standards, it causes con
cern in China, especially because the official rate is often too optimis
tic, and Western analysts estimate the inflation rate to be closer to 15
percent. Even the more optimistic official figure for average increases
in urban retail prices is over 10 percent, and for some foods it is as
high as 35 percent. As a result, by the end of the year, after two years
of decontrolled meat distribution, pork was again being rationed in
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and sugar was being rationed in Beij
ing. Reflecting concern that the problem may worsen, in October
China began a nationwide investigation into possible illegal price
rises, underpayment of taxes, and profiteering.
Rapid increases in investment in 1987 contributed to the govern
ment's problems with inflation and macro imbalance. Investment in
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creased in energy, transportation, and irrigation, all-important sectors
where it was badly needed. However, overall investment increased
much more than was called for by the plan. When total investment
exceeds planned levels it contributes to shortages of materials, adds
inflationary pressure, and slows completion of all projects. In addi
tion, excess investment is typically a result of relatively small,
non-priority projects. Approximately 90 percent of the new invest
ment projects started in 1987 entailed investments of less than a mil
lion yuan ($0.26 million). Although these projects are small, the sums
involved add up. At mid-year, fixed asset investment in state-owned
enterprises alone, that is, not including collective and private invest
ment, had increased 21 percent more than during the same period of
1986, and capital-construction investment had increased 19.3 percent.
In response to the over-ambitious mid-year investment levels, the
state cancelled or postponed a number of projects, managing to re
duce the increases in fixed assets to 14.2 percent for the year and to
13.9 percent in capital-construction investment. While these cuts suc
cessfully slowed investment growth, it is likely that they dispropor
tionately affected major planned state projects, projects over which
the government has the most control. Total investment, including
state, collective, and private projects increased 16.5 percent, reaching
351.8 billion yuan ($94.57 billion). While this annual increase in total
investment was lower than the 18.7 increase in 1986, Chinese officials
still consider it to be too high.
Another major problem area for China's economy in recent years
has been the poor performance overall of state enterprises. For a
number of years output growth and profit levels of state-owned enter
prises have increased much slower than those of the collective sector.
In industry, for example, in the first half of 1987 industrial output of
state enterprises increased 10.2 percent over the same period of 1987,
while collective industrial output increased 22.9 percent.4 In 1986 state
industrial output increased only 6.2 percent, while collective industrial
output increased 16.7 percent.
Before 1979 collectives were at a disadvantage relative to state enter
prises. Because they were only secondary to the state plan, collectives
often had difficulty obtaining inputs, financing, and sales at fixed
prices. While state enterprises were covered by the plan, the collective
sector was expected to decline as socialism advanced, and therefore
its survival was not a priority. In the post-1978 period of reform,
however, the state sector's previous advantages in access to inputs, fi
nancing, and guaranteed sales has been eroded as markets have
4 Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1987, p. 52.
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increasingly supplemented the plan. Flexibility in output mix, input
sources, and pricing have become crucial to an enterprise's ability to
respond to changing market conditions, and while collective enter
prises have proven adaptable, state enterprises have little experience
in such matters. Meanwhile, planners continue to rely on state enter
prises to guarantee a minimum production level for important goods.
Once planned output levels have been met, enterprises are supposed
to use their excess capacity profitably. Managers of state enterprises
who are neither used to making their way in markets nor given ade
quate reign to do so, face a difficult task: state enterprises now serve
as the last remaining pillar of the old planned system, but simulta
neously must meet the demands of a new, semi-market system that is
the product of piecemeal reforms.
The problems facing state enterprises are severe. Their profits are
often squeezed as they purchase inputs at high market prices but sell
their output to the state at relatively low, fixed prices. In the case of
steel, for example, the state price is 800 yuan per ton compared with
a market price of 1,500 yuan or more. Because inputs supplied by the
plan are usually inadequate even to produce the planned portion of
output, sales of the above-plan output at higher, market prices often
are inadequate to cover rising input costs. Furthermore, enterprises
are under pressure from workers to raise wages since wages have
risen elsewhere in the economy. As of September the wage bill of
state enterprises had increased 16.7 percent, contributing to increased
costs of production. Inflation, of course, exacerbates these problems.
The result is an incentive, albeit illegal, to under-fulfill the state plan,
selling as much output as possible for higher, market prices.
Another problem facing state enterprises is that despite the fact that
managers have been given more decision-making power in principle,
in practice managers have not had much leeway to decide output
mix, to hire or fire, or to implement linkages between remuneration
and worker performance. When managers decide to break with past
practices they take the risk, for example, of angering workers or en
dangering relatively secure supply arrangements. The incentives are
not high enough to encourage managers to take the risks involved in
trying new production or management methods. For example, man
agers who earn incomes that are high relative to those of the workers
are either criticized in the press or subject to regulations limiting earn
ings differentials. While this may not deter all managers, such criti
cism and regulations will tend to keep the differentials small and to
add to the uncertainty of where such reforms will ultimately lead po
litically.

26

Penelope B. Prime

Reform in 1987: Proposals and Progress
China's post-1978 reform program began in the agricultural sector.
In recent years the focus of reform has moved to industry, and in
1987, to state industrial enterprises in particular. Attempts to improve
incentives and to increase connections between sectors have also been
made through taxation and pricing changes. All of these reforms have
been aided by an accepted retreat from socialized production. For ex
ample, in agriculture families now contract directly with the govern
ment to sell their output in return for using land, rather than working
with other households in collectivized production. Small, privately
run commercial and service enterprises have been allowed to increase
rapidly. As of June 1987, the private sector accounted for 82.7 percent
of the commercial and service businesses and handled 13.2 percent of
the total retail volume. Collective enterprises have also made a come
back and are now encouraged to compete with state and private en
terprises. China's official position is that multiple forms of ownership
are valuable—and inevitable—while China is in its current stage of
primitive socialism. This interpretation was solidified at the Thirteenth
Party Congress in October.
In addition to encouraging different forms of ownership, another
principle of reform allows for the separation of ownership and man
agement. This separation is crucial to reform in agriculture, for exam
ple; although all land is state-owned, individual families now are
making decisions concerning the use of land. In state industry this
approach is necessary because if managers are to have autonomy in
economic decision making, the input of Party officials and economic
ministries overseeing the enterprises must be lessened. Several issues
concerning the progress of reform in 1987 are best understood in this
context.
The Separation of Ownership and Management
Four categories of reforms that were important in 1987 further sepa
rate management from ownership. These are manager responsibility,
issues surrounding enterprise funds, enterprise sales of stocks and
bonds, and land sales. These will be discussed in turn.
At the beginning of 1987, 40 percent of state-owned enterprises re
portedly were using a manager-responsibility system. Throughout
1987 the other 60 percent were encouraged to do the same. In the
context of China's attempts to reform, manager responsibility refers to
a shift in decision making from state planners to managers of state
enterprises. This system is designed to expand managers' flexibility in
running an enterprise, and it is also a way to lessen Party involve-
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merit in the daily operations of enterprises and to provide incentives
to increase production while reducing costs. Managers' performance
is evaluated by a committee made up of members of an enterprise's
Party committee, trade union, and worker congress. This evaluation is
based on performance indicators such as improvements in productiv
ity and profitability and the firm's ability to meet its contracts. Man
agers' salary increases are then tied to these performance criteria.
In theory, manager responsibility is essential as more of the econ
omy becomes market oriented and less is planned. But while mana
gers' responsibilities are being increased significantly, improvements
in autonomy continue to be problematic. Since the enterprise commit
tee's role goes beyond consultation to having the authority to super
vise and evaluate the manager, it remains to be seen whether true au
tonomy is possible. This system may weaken the input of the Party,
but whether such a committee, which represents several interests,
would be easier to deal with probably varies from enterprise to enter
prise.
A more radical form of manager responsibility currently being tried
is that of leasing state-owned enterprises, or even outright sales of
property rights, to individuals or groups of individuals who mortgage
funds in return for the right to run the enterprise as they see fit, tak
ing the resulting profits or losses. This reform has so far been tried
primarily in small, service-oriented state enterprises. Leasing avoids
the potential compromises in autonomy that may result under a su
pervising committee because there is no such committee. The problem
of insufficient incentive, i.e., inadequate salary, is also avoided since
there are fewer restrictions on lessees earning high incomes. But leas
ing also takes separation of ownership and management one step fur
ther than the adoption of the more general form of manager responsi
bility. The Chinese press often has warned of the consequences for
socialism if leasing were extended to large, important enterprises,
which would, in their opinion, erode the very foundations of socialist
ownership "by the whole people."
The probability of either of these manager-responsibility systems
improving the efficiency of the enterprises is partly dependent on
what happens when an enterprise loses money and on whether enter
prises have sources of funds independent of the offices that oversee
their activities.
Pressures on systems of responsibility are created when enterprises
do not make profits. To achieve true autonomy and make responsibil
ity effective, enterprises must be held accountable for losses through
corrective financing arrangements or bankruptcy. In the past when
enterprises could not repay loans, or when they were not profitable,
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the government budget absorbed the loss. A reform designed to
lessen this burden on the government was proposed in 1987 to begin
sometime in 1988. This reform, referred to as “double accounting,"
would explicitly identify sources and uses of funds as state funds or
enterprise funds. Then, if an enterprise incurred a loss with the state,
it would be required to use its other funds to repay that loss. In this
way an enterprise incurring losses in its transactions with the state
could not, for example, simultaneously be using its own funds for in
vestment.
If an enterprise continues to lose money, then bankruptcy is the
next logical step. If there is no possibility of failure, then managers
know that even if losses persist, government funds always will come
to the rescue. But bankruptcy is an alien concept in a socialist econ
omy where enterprises are publicly owned. Even if bankruptcy is
written into law, the experience of other socialist economies suggest
that it will be seldom used. The costs of unemployment, disillusioned
workers, and idle equipment are just too great. Many in China argue
that at the very least a welfare or unemployment benefit system is
needed before bankruptcy can be taken seriously.
Another proposed reform that would provide an alternative source
of funds for enterprises is the establishment of a capital-construction,
or investment, fund. This fund would be for investment projects
other than major, long-term state projects covered by planned invest
ment. How this fund would actually work is still vague at this point,
but the principle appears to be one of instituting a central source of
funding, other than bank loans, for small and medium-size projects.
The reliance on bank loans for these types of projects has resulted in
an over-issuance of credit. Through centralization, the fund would be
less vulnerable to local interests and could better control credit expan
sion. The fund would also coordinate requests for investment to avoid
duplication of investment projects within localities and to aid bal
anced development among the sectors of the economy. The imple
mentation of this type of fund would weaken the connection between
enterprises and the specialized ministries and local officials upon
which the enterprises have been fairly dependent for investment
funds as well as for allocations of inputs. This change would be par
ticularly helpful to enterprise associations, which are groups of enter
prises whose members belong to different administrative levels and
geographic areas. Associations do not directly benefit any one locality,
a fact that now weakens their ability to gain access to loans, inputs,
and markets. Along these lines, the central government announced in
October that it would begin distributing funds for research in technology development directly from the State Science and Technology
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Commission to enterprises and individuals instead of giving these
funds to ministries and local officials to disperse.
Another source of funds affected by the separation of ownership
and management is the issuance of bonds or the selling of shares in
an enterprise. Through such equity sales the buyers are actually ac
quiring assets, or claims on assets, that they and the rest of the public
already technically own. This problem does not arise with collective
enterprises, and to date equity sales have been more common in the
collective sector. Nonetheless, state-enterprise issues occurred
throughout 1987, and at the Thirteenth Party Congress Zhao Ziyang
reaffirmed that this practice would continue on a trial basis. The exist
ing stock market is far from a daily operation, and only four official is
sues of state-enterprise stocks have been made since 1985. However,
this underestimates the number of enterprises involved in issuing
stocks and bonds. Reportedly, in Shanghai alone, over 1,500 enter
prises have raised funds in this way. Regulations concerning issues
are in effect, including the percentage of the capital stock value that
can be sold, but private individuals as well as other enterprises are al
lowed to purchase these assets.
Land sales have also occurred. In September the Special Economic
Zone of Shenzhen held its first land auction, offering land-use rights
for 50 years, with transfer and mortgage rights included.5 Shanghai is
interested in using such sales to raise capital for development, but so
far this special right permitted in Shenzhen has not been extended to
other parts of China. At the same time, Chinese enterprises that want
to expand their production facilities often seek out rural areas in
which to build factories or take over and convert existing facilities.
Rural communities receive some financial return for allowing enter
prises use of the land. Economic concerns aside, these practices chal
lenge established notions about socialist state ownership and control
of valuable resources such as land; in principle land sales and leasing
are forbidden by the constitution. How widespread these practices be
come therefore will depend in part on whether they can be reconciled
with the theory of socialism.
Price and Tax Reform
Many analysts believe that the key to the success of China's eco
nomic reform program is price reform. For example, since the profit
level of an enterprise is directly influenced by prices, unless relative
prices reflect production costs and user demands, enterprise5 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 15, 1987, pp. 82, 84.
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responsibility systems will be ineffective in producing a more efficient
use of resources. In fact, increased responsibility may only exacerbate
the problems that may attend true decentralization of production and
investment decisions. However, if price reform were instituted,
thereby radically changing relative prices throughout the economy, it
would affect income distribution throughout the economy in a way
that could upset the political status quo. The daunting complications
of working out a smooth transition have left price reform primarily in
the realm of study rather than official implementation.
Meanwhile, changes in relative prices are occurring as the propor
tion of output produced for the plan and sold to the government falls.
While the price of output bought by the state is fixed, output pro
duced beyond this, or commodities that are no longer part of the
plan, can be sold at negotiated or market prices. Depending on sup
ply and demand, these prices could be higher or lower than state
prices. The tendency, however, has been for prices to rise, contribut
ing to rises in the average price level. Whenever the rate of inflation
rises, pressure to control prices emerges in conjunction with a rever
sion to rationing.
Although the price issue is politically sensitive, price reform per se
is apparently not being blamed for the current round of inflation. A
new study on a possible next step in price reform was released in Oc
tober 1987, although no date for implementation was mentioned. Un
der this proposed system, actual prices would not be affected directly.
Instead, internal accounting prices, or "policy prices," would be es
tablished according to estimates of relative resource scarcities done by
the United Nations and the World Bank. These policy prices would
then be used by banks and officials of the Ministry of Finance, and
presumably by the proposed construction fund, to rank investment
projects and to decide appropriate tax rates. Policy prices would also
be used by enterprises to assess the economic feasibility of projects
and to measure progress toward improving productivity. Since part of
China's investment problem is created by misaligned prices that can
encourage investment in the wrong sectors—for example, in artifi
cially high-profit breweries instead of low-profit energy—use of these
internal prices would be an immense help. The success of using such
internal prices, however, would depend on enterprises believing that
actual prices would eventually move in the direction of the policy
prices. There would also have to be sufficient means to control invest
ment costs by delaying investment in projects for which, using the
policy prices, the cost was too great until such time as the policy and
market prices converged.
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A change in the investment tax has been proposed to help control
investment until investment costs accurately reflect resource costs.
There has been a 10 percent tax on investment since 1983, but this tax
was applicable only to investment of funds allocated through the state
budget and from bank loans. Local government investment and
projects funded by non-budgetary enterprise funds were exempt.
Changes will be instituted in 1988 to raise the price to enterprises of
non-planned investment. This will decrease over-investment caused
by the availability of funds at artificially low costs without having to
rely solely on an approval process. Beginning in 1988 investment will
be subject to three tax rates of 10, 20, and 30 percent, applicable to all
types of investment funds except key projects approved by the central
government. Priority projects such as technological improvement will
be subject to the lowest tax, and “nonproductive" projects such as
hotels and office buildings will be taxed at the maximum rate.
International Trade and Investment
For the last several years China has imposed strict controls on im
ports in order to decrease its trade deficit. In 1985 the trade deficit
was $14.9 billion, and in 1986 it improved only slightly to $12 billion.
In 1987 very strict import controls were continued and were even ex
tended to important capital goods, which no doubt added to inflation
ary pressures as enterprises attempted to find substitutes where pos
sible. However, these controls led to an overall decrease in imports.
Simultaneously, exports were promoted. In the first nine months of
1987 exports increased 23.9 percent over the same period of 1986.
China has also been quite successful in altering the composition of its
exports away from raw materials and processing to high value-added
goods such as footwear, toys, sporting goods, and mechanical and
electrical goods.6
China's successful export promotion, however, has come at a price
to the national budget in the form of export subsidies. As this is not
sustainable, and as China prefers to maintain a near balance in trade,
new proposals to reform the trading system were released in 1987. In
the past, decentralization of international trading and control of for
eign exchange resulted in rapid increases and duplication of imports
which worsened the trade deficit. This time the thrust is to coordinate
enterprises within the same industry to prevent price-cutting competi
tion between them and to pool their knowledge and resources to help
them crack foreign markets. A group of enterprises that trade in light
6 Cliinn Business Review, March-April 1987, p. 30.
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industrial goods, handicrafts, and garments will be selected to experi
ment with a responsibility system in trading. They will be given the
right to retain foreign exchange as a reward for increasing exports and
profits. In order to encourage exports of highly processed goods, the
percentage of foreign exchange that can be retained by the enterprise
will be higher when the level of processing involved is higher. Tar
geted enterprises also will receive some state funding to upgrade facil
ities and will receive priority with respect to needed inputs.
After a major decline in 1986 foreign investment in China re
bounded in 1987. In the first half of the year 738 joint-venture con
tracts were signed, representing a 30.4 percent increase over the same
period of 1986. Actual investment in the first six months was $500
million, an increase of 14.5 percent. Since 1979 contracts worth $17.1
billion have been signed, and actual foreign investment has reached
about $5 billion. In addition, off-shore oil contracts worth $2.86 billion
have been signed; service and engineering contracts currently total
$6.37 billion; and loans for $20.7 billion have been made for construc
tion of industrial and infrastructure projects.
Several changes were implemented in 1987 to help foreigners do
business in China. First, the tax on wage and salary income earned by
individual foreigners in China was reduced by 50 percent. Second, to
help mediate when problems arise, the State Economic Commission
set up the Coordinating Center for Business Co-operation. It is un
clear how supportive or efficient the center will prove to be, but per
haps its very existence will lend credence to complaints filed by for
eign companies. Up until now, if foreign companies felt contracts had
been misinterpreted or broken, they had little recourse but to threaten
lawsuits, which were ineffective given China's nearly nonexistent le
gal system. Furthermore, with no specified part of the bureaucracy
taking responsibility for such problems, their Chinese counterparts
had little reason to fear reprisal. Third, a new Trust and Investment
Corporation, technically falling under the jurisdiction of the People's
Bank of China, was established by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade. This corporation has a sizable capital base and
will deal with foreign-exchange investments and loans.

Evaluation: Future Prospects for Raising Living Standards
Despite uncertainties concerning the socialist nature of some of
China's reforms and macro imbalances, household income and con
sumption levels have clearly risen. Household surveys periodically
carried out by various Chinese research groups give some indication
of the improvements in income that have occurred since the reform
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program began. One survey covering 66,000 rural households in 846
counties found that in 1978, 33.3 percent of households earned less
than 100 yuan in annual net income per person, while in 1986 this
percentage had dropped to 1.1 percent. In 1978, 2.4 percent of the
households in this survey earned more than 300 yuan per person in
net annual income, and by 1986 this percentage had increased to 66.9
percent. Another survey found that in urban areas in 1981, 6.5 per
cent of the households earned 60 yuan per person per month, or 720
yuan per capita annually, while in 1986 this percentage had increased
to 63.4 percent. Along with improvements in income, there is ample
evidence of improved consumption levels as households increasingly
desire high-quality and expensive goods. Rising rates of saving indi
cate that people willingly wait to purchase the high-quality goods
they desire.
These increases in living standards have contributed to widespread
support for the reform program. Several trends, however, may be
working against future increases in living standards in both rural and
urban areas, and without those increases support for the reforms
could erode.
One such trend in rural areas is that the prices of inputs such as
fertilizer are rising at the same time that growth in agricultural output
is slowing compared with the initial years of rural reform. Some ana
lysts in China feel agricultural purchasing prices should again be
raised to compensate for these cost increases and to serve as incen
tives to increase production. Others disagree, arguing that after a
number of years of budget deficits, the government cannot afford
higher purchasing prices. This group tends to favor decontrolling dis
tribution of agricultural products altogether, including grain, and let
ting the market determine the price. Even if prices rise enough to
stimulate incentives to produce more, the question for agricultural
workers in China will be how to raise output while keeping expenses
at a minimum. For example, are there further gains to be made from
reorganizing production? Will more use of fertilizer make a difference?
And what kinds of long-term investments should be made? Chinese
analysts agree that rural reform needs to be revitalized in 1988, but a
consensus is lacking on what should happen next.
Second, working against the future standard of living in China are
trends in population and education. China's rate of population
growth is again on the rise, especially in rural areas. Between 1985
and 1986 the birth rate increased from 17.8 per thousand to 20.8 per
thousand. Stricter enforcement of the one-child-per-family policy has
been announced for 1988, but progress will not be easy. The success
of the rural reforms themselves is partly to blame for the slippage in
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population control. The prospects of higher income through higher
production, and consequently the desirability of having more family
members to help, have outweighed the social or financial costs of ig
noring the population policy. For similar reasons, increasing numbers
of rural children are not finishing even the minimum of education re
quired. While the extra family workers are contributing to current in
creases in family income, these trends may have negative effects on
increases in average family income in the future if, as some studies
indicate, education levels correlate to improved skills and lower fertil
ity.
Third, the problem of inflation eroding increases in living standards
is particularly relevant for urban residents. As noted earlier, inflation
in the cities has been consistently higher than the average; it was as
high as 35 percent with respect to food prices in some areas during
1987. Because average wages have been increasing, inflation will be at
least affordable for some, but others will not be so fortunate. Wage in
creases vary by work unit depending on whether or not the enter
prise is profitable, and although they are high in some cases when
bonuses are included, they rarely match the 35 percent inflation rate.
Wages of workers who have temporary contracts with enterprises are
not likely to keep up with inflation unless a worker has a special skill
in high demand. Expanding the labor-contract system is part of the
reform program, which is meant to develop a labor market in China,
giving both workers and enterprises more choice in employment. The
trade-off for this flexibility, however, may be decreases in wages, bene
fits, and job security. If wages of these workers increase slower than
those of permanent workers, then expanding this system will bring
down the average wage. Finally, people on fixed incomes will be es
pecially unhappy with the adverse effects of inflation on their real in
comes.
A major contributing factor to inflation in urban areas is rising
housing costs, which are the result of changes in the way housing is
distributed and managed. Housing costs to consumers have been ex
tremely low. Monthly rent has been estimated to be less than one
yuan in some areas, far below the costs of maintenance, let alone the
costs involved in building new apartments. With reform, rents for ex
isting housing are to be gradually increased and adjusted to account
for the amount of floor space; residents will be encouraged to pur
chase their apartments; and rents or purchase prices for new apart
ments will reflect the building and maintenance costs. While these
proposals are designed to deal with the serious housing shortage,
they will also lead to substantial increases in monthly expenses for ur
ban residents.
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So while individuals have seen impressive increases in their in
comes with reform, further increases in living standards are likely to
be more modest. In itself this need not weaken the momentum for re
form, for there is still no comparison with the pre-reform period
when wages stagnated, but efforts to raise public understanding con
cerning these adverse trends will become increasingly necessary.
Issues concerning income distribution have also created some con
fusion. Although prosperity was not the norm before 1979, austerity
created relatively equal income distribution. Since 1979 Party and gov
ernment officials have condoned less equal distribution, in part to in
troduce material incentives into the system and in part because this
was inevitable once reforms began. Unequal income distribution is
nonetheless a sensitive issue. This is especially true if some people's
prosperity is due to unearned income from owning assets, which
compromises the socialist principle of “to each according to his work"
and gives those who are less prosperous a legitimate complaint.
The government position on income distribution has been to accept
worsening inequalities as long as incomes are earned legally. A hier
archy of wages is maintained; for example, managers earn more than
the workers they supervise. The government has also been concerned
about the low incomes of those who live in China's northwest and
southwest, where the land is barren and the climate is difficult. Per
capita annual average income in these areas is estimated at less than
200 yuan ($54), compared with an annual average of 424 yuan ($114)
in other rural areas and 1,600 yuan ($430) for workers and staff in nonagricultural jobs. Some of the government's efforts to improve the
incomes of these people include moving them to more hospitable en
virons, supplying subsidized loans to develop local employment op
portunities, and seeking additional aid specifically for the poorest ar
eas from international agencies like the World Bank.

Conclusion
After much uncertainty with respect to both the future of China's
reform program and its ability to control runaway growth, 1987 ended
on a surprisingly positive note. The Thirteenth Party Congress pro
claimed China to be in the "primary stage of socialism," allowing flex
ible interpretations of reforms, and labeled 1988 the beginning of the
third stage of reform. Despite problems due to the "trial and stage"
approach to implementation, the current and proposed reforms pri
marily reinforce each other and attempt to confront the problems at
hand. For example, enterprises need access to funds to achieve the
much-sought-after autonomy; the stock and bond markets and the
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proposed construction fund address this concern. At the same time,
central officials need some way to influence the use of such funds;
both the extension of the investment tax, which discourages invest
ment by raising its cost, and the use of the proposed "policy prices"
as the basis for project selection address this issue.
With respect to growth, unreasonably high growth rates occurred
during 1987 in some sectors but were lower by year's end. The decent
harvest, an easing of the trade deficit, and equal growth rates in
heavy and light industry will all help correct demand and supply im
balances.
Many problems remain, of course, with inflation being one obvious
reflection of these problems and perhaps also a key obstacle to timely
implementation of further reform. Concerns over whether or not im
balances will worsen in 1988 are being expressed by Chinese analysts
and officials at all levels. Many reforms are still in an experimental,
trial stage, and it is unclear when, if ever, they will be implemented
more generally. The bankruptcy law, for example, has not appeared
lately in official discussions of the future of China's economic reforms,
and Zhao Ziyang did not mention it in his pivotal speech at the Thir
teenth Party Congress.
Reflecting concern with rapid, imbalanced growth, plans for 1988
emphasize results and not speed. Reform work is to focus on improv
ing investment decisions, input distribution, the international trading
system, and wage and personnel options in enterprises and in civil
service. The next step in rural reform is under discussion.
The combination of new political leadership and persistent eco
nomic problems leaves the Chinese economy in 1988 with a delicate
balance of high expectations and an uncertain political and economic
environment. To some extent progress with respect to economic re
form has been placed on the shoulders of enterprise managers. But in
any economic system, managers perform least well in uncertainty,
and in China this is only compounded by the still-vague division of
authority between managers and the political cadre. Finally, with the
appointment of Li Peng to replace Zhao Ziyang as acting premier, the
priorities with respect to reform could change. Li, trained in the So
viet Union as an engineer and raised in the center of power as Zhou
Enlai's adopted son, may favor slower implementation of market au
tonomy and decentralization of enterprises. Reform, both economic
and political, has been reaffirmed by the Party Congress; how this
translates into action in 1988 remains to be seen.

